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Abstract
Online reviews have become a valuable and sig-
nificant resource, for not only consumers but
companies, in decision making. In the absence
of a trusted system, highly popular and trustwor-
thy internet users will be assumed as members
of the trusted circle. In this paper, we describe
our focus on quarantining deceiving Yelps users
that employs both review spike detection (RSD)
algorithm and spam detection technique in bridg-
ing review networks (BRN), on extracted key fea-
tures. We found that more than 80% of Yelp’s
accounts are unreliable, and more than 80% of
highly rated businesses are subject to spamming.
1. The Problem Statement
Online reviews, nowadays, have become a valuable and
significant resource, for not only consumers but compa-
nies, in decision making. In the absence of a trusted sys-
tem, highly popular and trustworthy internet users will be
assumed as members of the trusted circle. The problem
statement we are arguing is that: given a set of user rat-
ing reviews, determine whether they are trustworthy or un-
reliable; from these deceptive reviews of particular target
business, identify and quarantine any Yelp account produc-
ing such over-threshold amount of those. Intrigued by the
works of (Pranata & Susilo, 2016), the figure 1 visualizes
an entire process, and the road map for tackling the learn-
ing problem is as follows:
• Cluster the most popular Yelps users, and find busi-
nesses that these have rated
• Employ RSD algorithm (Rahman et al., 2015) and
BRN technique (Rayana & Akoglu, 2015) to detect
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any unusual rating, analyze its corresponding busi-
ness, and determine its validity
• Compare the popular users’ disputable ratings, for
those target businesses, against the business trusted
values; and then, quarantine deceptive users based on
comparison results
The rest of this report is constructed as follows: the next
section is to discuss features selection for determining pop-
ular users, and potential spam scores of both deceptive re-
views and target businesses; the third section introduces our
hybrid mechanism, employing both RSD and BRN, to de-
tect the review spike aiming to boost up a businesss good-
ness; the last sections mainly discuss the evaluation met-
rics, experimented results, and our final thoughts about this
work.
Figure 1. The flowchart of quarantine deceiving Yelp users from
Yelps user and review data set. The blue region denotes features
extraction, the yellow region is responsible for detecting anoma-
lous ratings, and the green region is for analysis and decision mak-
ing in quarantining users. Tb and Sb denote a trusty score and a
spam score for a business, and Sr is the calculated spam score for
each review.
2. Features Extraction Engineering
Since the number of users are large, the most efficient
way to find those popular ones is to use clustering tech-
niques that take a feature vector as its input. Similarly,
much can be inferred from textual and behavioral data of
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reviews. This section outlines meaningful features extrac-
tion for serving the purpose of our work.
2.1. Popular Users
To cluster a group of most popular users out off nearly
650K records, we decide to use the k-mean algorithm with
an input as a set of selected user features. The Yelp user
records dataset provides a number of features to work with,
as inputs to the k-mean algorithm; however, not all are use-
ful. The following features are believed to be important,
as they will have a significant impact on determining the
most popular users: yelping since - the year in which an
user started Yelp, average star - the average ratings of all
businesses given by an user, elite count - the total num-
ber of years in which an user is part of the Yelps elite
squad, fans count - the total number of fans that an user
has, friends count - the total number of friends of a user,
reviews count - the total number of reviews that a user has
made, total votes -the total number of votes from others,
and total compliments -the total numbers of compliments
from other users.
2.2. Potential Fraudulent Reviews
Textual features are derived from the reviews written by the
users; whereas the behavioral features are computed from
meta-data such as a review time stamp, ranks, and review
patterns. We extract the following features for determining
possible deceptive reviews: RD - rating deviation, the ab-
solute deviation of a rating from the businesses average val-
ues, as spammers tend to write unreliable reviews deviating
from this value; EXT - extremity of a review of 1 if a rat-
ing is 4,5 and 0 if it is 1,2,3; ETF - the fact that a spammer
wrote early reviews to make an impact on the overall rating
of the business; ISR - a value of 1 if the re- view is the
users only review, otherwise 0; PCW - the ratio of all cap-
ital words, as spammers tend to use a lot of capital words
for drawing attention; PP1 - the ratio of the first person
pronouns in reviews, as in deceptive ones, the second per-
son pronouns are mostly used instead (Rayana & Akoglu,
2015); EXC - the number of exclamations used in the re-
view to attract attention.
2.3. Target Spamming Businesses
Similarly, to calculate the potential spam score for each tar-
get business, the following features are extracted: MNR
- the maximum number of reviews written in a day for a
business; PR, NR - the ratio of positive reviews and neg-
ative reviews, as argued in (Rayana & Akoglu, 2015) that
spammers rate more than 80% of reviews as 4 or 5; avgRD
- the average rating deviation of business reviews that de-
termines whether a business is being a target of spammed;
ERD - the entropy rating distribution of businesses reviews
to determine the uncertainty of the distribution of review
ratings; ETG - the entropy of temporal gaps capturing any
bursts in review activities; RL - the average length of a re-
view.
3. Detecting Anomaly in Ratings
3.1. Clustering Popular Users
The algorithm searches over a range of k values and select
the best k clusters based on the approximation of the pos-
teriors of the clusters, or Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) score (Pranata & Susilo, 2016). BIC is measured
through the likelihood of how well the clusters model the
data, which is produced by a spherical Gaussian distribu-
tion. Hence, the higher value of BIC is, the more probable
of the clustering being a good fit is:
BIC(D | k) = l(D | k)−
pj
2
log(R) (1)
whereD is the dataset, k is the number of clusters, R is the
number of feature vectors, pj is the number of parameters
to estimate clustering, and l(D | k) is the likelihood that is
measured as:
l(D | k) =
k∑
i=1
−
Ri
2
log(2pi)−
Rid
2
log(δ2)
−
Ri − 1
2
+Rilog(
Ri
R
) (2)
whereRi is the number of feature vectors in i
th cluster, d is
the cluster center, and δ2 is the average variance of Eucle-
dian distance from data point to its cluster center. Given a
group of popular Yelp users P , the Algorithm 1 shows the
steps taken to find the list of distinct businesses B that P
has rated.
Algorithm 1 Business Extraction
Input: a group of popular users P , review recordsR
Output: list of distinct businesses B that P has rated
for i = 1 to |P| do
Bi ← FindBusiness(i,R)
for b = 1 to |Bi| do
if Rb ≥ 10 and b 6∈ B then
B ← b
end if
end for
end for
3.2. Review Spike Detection (RSD)
Deceptive users increase the rating of a target business
by posting fraudulent reviews. The RSD module detects
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this by identifying outlier in a rating timeline that receives
a higher number of positive (or negative) reviews than
normal. Using the dispersion measurements of Box and
Whiskers plots (Rahman et al., 2015; Tamhane & Dunlop,
2000; Prithivirajan et al., 2015) in detecting outliers, RSD
computes the Upper Outlier Fence (UOF) value. The spike
is detected when |Pd| > UOF, where Pd is a set of posi-
tive reviews posted during a day. For example, consider a
business has an UOF value of 10, we say that there exists
a positive spike if that business receives more than 10 pos-
itive reviews in any particular day. Similarly for detecting
negative spikes.
Fraudulent reviews can be posted either constantly in a
short period of time or gradually over a long time interval.
Thus, a sense of review distribution over time is necessary
for determining a spike. According to (Tamhane & Dunlop,
2000), the Box and Whiskers plot (figure 2) yields five im-
portant statical summaries, in term of review-posted days:
the most outdated, first quartile, second quartile or median,
third quartile, the most current. For each business timeline,
the interquartile range (IQR) is the difference between the
first and third quartiles. In terms of ratings, Upper Outlier
Fence (UOF) and Lower Outlier Fence (LOF), which have
an abnormal distance from the others, must satisfy:
UOF ≥Q3 + 1.5(IQR) (3)
LOF ≤Q1− 1.5(IQR) (4)
where IQR = Q3−Q1. A spiky business is detected when
it has a set of reviews either exceedingUOF or falling under
LOF.
Figure 2. Box andWhiskers plot for a review distribution over 125
days.
3.3. Bridging Networks for Calculating Spam Scores
It is trivial that an extreme high (H) or low (L) rating is
more suspicious for each target business. To quantify the
extremity of a feature rating ri, the proposed method from
(Rayana & Akoglu, 2015) uses the empirical cumulative
distribution function (CDF) to estimate the probability that
a target business Bj contains a rating as low or as high as
ri. Specifically, for each rating ri, 1 ≤ ri ≤ |Rb|, CDF
computes the f value for the L type by finding all ratings
smaller than a target business’ rating. Similarly, finding all
values that are as large as a target one for computing the f
value of the H type.
f(rbi) =
{
1− P (X ≤ rbi) if H
P (X ≤ rbi) if L
(5)
Both feature types eventually receive a low value if they are
both suspicious. To get a stronger representation, we now
combine all these values into a single spam score on a scale
of 0 to 1 using:
S = 1−
√∑|Rb|
i=1 f(rbi)
2
|Rb|
> Sthreshold (6)
A higher value of S indicates an abnormal review, or a busi-
ness potentially being a target of spam. Generally, detect-
ing a spike from RSD and evaluating its deceptive score
will help in narrowing down a set of popular users P who
manipulates a business Bb’s rating.
4. Evaluation
In this report, we experiment on different size k of clus-
tering popular users. (Pranata & Susilo, 2016) performs
clustering from k = 2 to k = 60 and find that k = 4
yielded the optimal group of popular users. However, our
approach finds that the number of clusters does not affect
an outcome of the popular users cluster. More specifically,
we are able to determine 46 popular users, independently
on how many clusters are being calculated, from a set of
nearly 650K Yelps account. Details on this popular group
will be provided in the next section.
Comparing against (Rahman et al., 2015)s execution of
RSD on an entire Yelps review dataset for finding spiky
businesses, our input domain is much more smaller, hence
more efficient. Since our approach starts with clustering
popular users and their rated business, the RSD algorithm
only needs to run over this set of popular businesses. In-
terestingly, despite of a difference in the review space,
our finding agrees with (Rahman et al., 2015) that one will
need to generate at least n
7
fraudulent reviews to increase
the ratings of a business by a half point, where n is the num-
ber of reliable reviews. The mathematical proof for this can
be found in (Rahman et al., 2015).
According to (Rayana & Akoglu, 2015), a spam score S
for each business or a review is calculated to determine
the probability of being a target for spamming. Similarly,
we use this metric to determine whether a detected spike
is deceptive. We argue that although a popular user might
give an extreme outlier review, but it could be an honest
one, due to personal interest or emotional feelings. Yelps
users are only quarantined when they exceeds a limit of
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deceptive reviews on a spiky business, and their reviews
are far off a tolerated range of the business trusted score.
(Pranata & Susilo, 2016) define a businesss trusted score
as an average of all ratings; whereas we consider it to be
an average of all non-deceptive ratings: Tb =
1
|Rb|
∑
r,
where b 6∈ B.
5. Results
From our experiment, we find that there exists a group of
46 popular users affecting an entire review dataset signifi-
cantly, regardless to how may clusters are being classified.
Table 2 and ?? list all feature values of such clustering. It is
noticeable that Cluster 2 seems to be the most popular one
as all of its feature values are larger than the others. Our
finding is some sort similar with (Pranata & Susilo, 2016),
as their work also confirms that Cluster 2 groups the most
popular users; except it has 43 users. One feasible expla-
nation is that we randomly select a set of k centroids for
k-mean clustering, in which each feature is also randomly
generated from a given range; whereas (Pranata & Susilo,
2016) specify particular centroids. Additionally, given this
list of 46 popular users, 3202 businesses are founded by the
algorithm 1.
Table 1. Clustering results for Yelp’s user records when k = 4
Features Cluster 0 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
yelping since 2008.25 2008.58 2008.89 2012.38
average star 3.88 3.84 3.85 3.75
elite count 38.73 38.34 37.74 2.86
fans 390.22 262.35 548.76 1.18
friends count 20946.6 19874.26 30833.41 159.88
review count 1437.97 1119.04 1994.20 25.35
total votes 43021.45 28782.12 75479.22 83.55
total compliments 21382.02 12293.42 19308.48 9.03
total users 60 95 46 686355
Table 2. Clustering results for Yelp’s user records when k = 3
Features Cluster 0 Cluster 1 Cluster 2
yelping since 2008.25 2008.39 2008.89
average star 3.88 3.74 3.85
elite count 38.73 2.87 37.74
fans 390.22 1.22 548.76
friends count 20946.6 162.61 30833.41
review count 1437.97 25.50 1994.20
total votes 43021.45 87.25 75479.22
total compliments 21382.02 10.73 19308.48
total users 60 686450 46
Moreover, we find 2715 spiky businesses which is 84.79%
of businesses rated by popular users, and this is less than
the results of (Rahman et al., 2015). It is expected as
we only consider those rated by popular users; whereas
(Rahman et al., 2015) take every single business into their
account. Additionally, due to the fact that most of busi-
nesses has deceptive ratings spreading over a long period
of time, the RSD algorithm runs on an entire timeframe of
2004 - 2016. The figure 3 shows a sample RSD plot for a
single business from 2008 to 1016.
Figure 3. A review spike detection plot for a business from 2008 -
2016. During the years from 2013 to 2015, this business receives
a high amount of positive ratings whose values are larger than 3.0,
mostly 4.0.
(Pranata & Susilo, 2016) claim that most popular users are
untrustworthy but do not provide any statistical results. In
contrast, we try to understand how many popular users are
actually untrustworthy due to the fact that, sometimes, their
judgement is affected by emotional feelings. Since the rat-
ing range is from 1 to 5, we set the tolerate offset to be
0.5. This means that, given a trusted business score, ones
will be classified as deceptive if their ratings are greater
than Tb + 0.5 or less than Tb − 0.5. Additionally, a quar-
antined user must make more than a threshold amount of
such ratings. The table 3 shows the correlation between a
threshold amount of deceptive ratings and a number of quar-
antined users. Obviously, the smaller amount of threshold,
the higher the percentage of quarantined users. In fact, it
is reasonable to conclude that given the Yelps user dataset,
there are 46 popular users and more than 80% of those are
untrustworthy.
Table 3. The number of quarantined users based on the threshold
amount of deceptive ratings
Threshold Number of Quarantine Users Percentage
3 43 93.48%
4 42 91.30%
5 42 91.30%
6 42 91.30%
7 41 89.13%
8 39 84.78%
9 38 82.61%
10 38 82.61%
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6. Conclusion
This paper aims to quarantine Yelps users making a large
amount of deceptive reviews. Our approach starts with clus-
tering popular users and their rated businesses. Employing
RSD and BRN, we determine whether a detected spike for
a business is trustworthy. A user is classified as deceptive
when making an exceeding amount of reviews on a spiky
business, whose values are out off a tolerated range. Con-
clusively, there are 46 popular users out of approximately
650,000Yelps accounts, andmore than 80% of those are de-
ceptive. Additionally, out of almost 3300 businesses rated
by popular users, 2715 or 84.79% of those are subject to
spamming; and a popular deceptive user needs to generate
at least a-seventh of a number of positive reviews for in-
creasing a business general ratings by a half-star.
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